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GASOLINE PRICES are the lowest they’ve been in a decade, and 
according to recent data from the 
Department of Energy, Americans are 
buying more gas than ever. While low 
gas prices are good for consumers, 
they may be troublesome to those who 
worry about greenhouse gas emissions. 
Meanwhile, two important federal 
policies are pushing ahead to decrease 
transportation sector emissions by 
increasing vehicle efϐiciency and the 
use of renewable fuels: the federal 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
standards and the US Renewable Fuel 
Standard (RFS). Both policies have 
substantial impacts on consumers’ 
vehicle and fuel choices as well as on 
their fuel spending. 
The Renewable Fuel Standard 
and RIN Markets
The RFS was passed in 2007 and 
established aggressive biofuel 
mandates—25 percent by 2022. The 
policy is a market-based regulation. 
Rather than requiring reϐineries to 
get into the biofuel business, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
created an accounting system where 
every gallon of biofuel produced in or 
imported into the United States generates 
a credit, known as a RIN. To comply 
with the RFS, reϐiners must turn in their 
required amount of RINs to the EPA at 
the end of each year. How they obtain 
those RINs is up to them. Petroleum 
reϐiners can buy RINS from independent 
biofuel producers, or get into the biofuel 
business and produce RINs themselves. 
Importantly, the price of RINs is set by 
market forces. The RFS determines the 
demand for RINs by specifying how 
much biofuel, and therefore how many 
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RINs, need to be sold in aggregate each 
year. Biofuel producers determine the 
supply. As demand for RINs or the cost 
of producing biofuel increases, the price 
of RINs will increase and vice versa. 
Several individuals in the popular 
press, as well as reϐiners and large 
investors in oil companies, have called 
the viability of the RIN market into 
question recently. Criticisms come 
primarily in two forms: (a) the market 
lacks transparency and is subject to 
manipulation by speculators; and (b) 
reϐiners are getting unduly squeezed 
by RIN costs. Except for known fake 
RIN generation in the biodiesel market 
several years ago, there is little concrete 
evidence to support the ϐirst claim. 
Many markets operate outside of 
formal exchanges, and recent work by 
Lade, Lin-Lawell, and Smith (2016) 
ϐinds that RIN markets are efϐicient. 
The second claim ignores the economic 
principle of cost pass-through—when 
reϐiners’ costs go up, either because 
of increased oil prices or higher 
taxes, they pass a portion or all of the 
increased costs to downstream users. 
Impacts of the RFS on Consumers 
and Fuel Prices 
The RFS doesn’t just affect 
refineries and biofuel producers. 
The policy needs consumers to 
purchase more biofuels to succeed. 
For most consumers, this has meant 
switching from using pure gasoline 
to using E10—gasoline containing 
10 percent ethanol. In fact, nearly 
all gasoline sold in the United States 
today contains 10 percent ethanol 
(EIA 2016). Still, in 2007 Congress 
envisioned an even greater amount 
of biofuel use. This means that 
consumers must start using higher 
blends of ethanol such as E15 and E85 
to reach the targets set in 2007. 
RINs directly impact the relative 
cost of ethanol and gasoline. They 
subsidize biofuels and increase the 
cost of selling gasoline and diesel. 
These effects are reϐlected in the price 
that regional fuel terminals pay for 
fuel, and therefore affect prices paid 
by consumers at the pump. How large 
these price effects are depends on the 
pass-through of RINs and the ethanol-
gasoline blend of fuels. 
Fuel market supply and demand 
conditions determine pass-through. 
Because fuel demand is inelastic 
(people’s driving habits do not change 
much in response to gas prices), we 
expect taxes and subsidies on upstream 
producers to be passed through to retail 
prices. This means that as RIN prices 
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increase, gasoline will become more 
expensive and ethanol will become 
cheaper. What some critics of the RFS 
essentially argue is that this is not 
happening due to some market failure. 
To examine this issue, we study RIN 
pass-through in a market where we most 
expect to detect it: the market for E85. 
E85 contains between 51 and 83 percent 
ethanol, and therefore the value of the 
RIN subsidy for ethanol is high relative 
to the RIN tax on gasoline. Thus, when 
RIN prices rise, we expect E85 to become 
cheaper. Examining prices from over 
450 stations in the Midwest, we ϐind that 
the net subsidy for E85 is mostly passed 
through to retail prices. 
Figure 1 illustrates this point for our 
stations in Iowa. In Figure 1(a), we graph 
the average retail E85 price along with 
our estimates of the wholesale ethanol 
and gasoline cost components of E85 from 
2013–2016. After accounting for state 
and federal retail fuel taxes, we ϐind that 
wholesale E85 fuel costs largely exceeded 
retail prices over the period. Only when 
we allow for pass-through of RINs by 
adjusting the wholesale fuel costs can we 
rationalize historical retail E85 prices. 
When we adjust the wholesale costs by 
the RIN subsidy and tax in Figure 1(b), 
our estimated average retail margins are 
$0.29/gal, in line with estimates of retail 
margins for other fuels. 
Overall, our ϐindings mean that as RIN 
prices rise, reϐiners and biofuel producers 
pass along their additional costs and 
savings onto consumers, respectively. 
What does this mean for US consumers 
in coming years?  This depends on how 
aggressively the EPA pushes the biofuel 
mandates. The agency has slowed the 
pace of the mandates since 2013 from 
the original schedule passed by Congress. 
However, if the EPA continues to push the 
mandates beyond 10 percent, consumers 
will likely see prices of higher blend 
ethanol fuels like E15 and E85 fall. 
The United States government wants 
you to use more ethanol, but it certainly 
doesn’t expect you to do so out of the 
kindness of your heart—that is the beauty 
of market-based mechanisms. Prices will 
adjust, a potential boon for consumers 
ϐilling up with greater than E10 blends. Just 
make sure you have the right vehicle—not 
all vehicles are capable of using more than 
10 percent ethanol. 
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Figure 1.  E85 pass-through—retail E85 prices and wholesale fuel 
costs in Iowa.
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